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Thus, citizenship is an expression of the collec-
tive identity of the polity it encapsulates in
political terms. In other words, the conditions
necessary for the acquirement of citizenship, and
the rights and duties associated with it, are
derivative of the identity of the community the
citizens belong to. In this context, our European
Union citizenship is in a sense an expression of
the European collective identity which has
developed throughout history. At the abstract
level the interrelationship between citizenship and
collective identity is an even more complex issue.
Some scholars convincingly argue that in fact we
face a three-tiered link between collective identity
and citizenship (Karolewski 2010, 21). Firstly,
collective identity enables the construction of
citizenship and the non-face-to-face interactions
governed by citizenship. Secondly, collective
identity is a function of the adopted model of
citizenship, and thirdly, the notion of citizenship
as belonging to a political community implicates a
normative claim of collective identity (ibidem, 22).
In order to simplify and elucidate the complex
phenomenon we might argue that in our context
Union citizenship results from European identity
and is to create and shape a European Union
identity. As Dora Kostakopoulou points it out
"European citizenship constituted a unique ex-
periment for stretching social and political
bonds beyond national boundaries and for
creating a political community in which diverse
peoples become associates in a collective
experience and institutional designers"
(Kostakopoulou 2007, 623).
Seen in this light, Union citizenship is to pro-
vide conditions for greater political participation in
various normative systems beyond the nation
state, conditions that are to limit marginalization
and discrimination (Lister & Pia 2008, 163). In this
paper however we focus on the link between
European Union citizenship and European identity.
The departure point of our considerations
comes from a conviction that the victory of
Solidarity and collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989
had a crucial significance for all of Europe, and
especially for the countries of Central and Eastern
1 “Good Citizenship” acquired through state
education
The concept of citizenship and the means of its
implementation and realization provide interesting
and important insights into the very nature of any
political community. How an individual is treated by
the community she/he belongs to, and what his/her
rights and obligations are, reveal a lot about the
character of the society in question. Therefore,
citizenship is a useful hallmark and instrument of
assessment of a particular political community,
because the quality of a community depends on how
it treats its weakest part – an individual. Further-
more, at least according to the Western political
tradition, with its roots in Aristotelian thought, indi-
viduals constitute the essence of a community. The
author of Politics argued that the “prosperity and
happiness of a state is equal to the happiness of
each individual…” (Aristotle 1980, 230, 243). This
explains why the meaning of the proper name
Athens was in fact used to denote Athenians as a
group name for the individuals comprising the
foundations of a community (Manville 1990, 7).
Individuals, conceived in a political context, formed
a specific type of a community/polity.
Another crucial feature of democratic citizenship,
rooted in the Greek tradition, is the rule of isonomy
– equality of rights for all citizens. Not all the
inhabitants of the Greek polis were equal, as
women, children, foreigners etc. were excluded from
citizenship. However, if you were a citizen you were
entitled to equal rights. In this light, a fundamental
attribute of the Greek polis was the freedom of all
citizens. According to Hannah Arendt, the Greek
freedom included: status of a free man, personal
inviolability, freedom of economic activity, right of
unrestricted movement (Arendt 1988, 12).
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Europe (CEECs). In the new situation they could
launch the realisation of their everlasting dream
involving liberalisation and a “return to Europe”. In
other words, the other words the inhabitants of the
former communist countries hoped to become equal
citizens of the integrated Europe.
There is a significant coincidence in the fact that
the CEECs began their accession process to the EU at
the very moment when the idea of European Union
citizenship was introduced into European law by the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It also should be empha-
sised that one of most important chapters of the
accession negotiations with the EU included the free
movement of persons, which – by the way – was
mentioned as the very first right envisaged within EU
citizenship. Indeed, the right to move freely is a
fundamental freedom of the internal market and an
essential political element of the rights linked to the
status of EU citizenship. Sergio Carrera is right in
arguing that
“if free movement was first conceived as a purely
economic phenomenon, the TEU provided a brand
new political and social meaning to the whole
debate. It also extended in Art. 12 the rights of
exit, entry and residence to all nationals of the
member states without any discrimination on
grounds of nationality” (Carrera 2004, 2).
Furthermore, the right to free movement and
residence within the territory of the Union is a pre-
condition for the exercise of the other basic rights
conferred by European Community (EC) law, inclu-
ding the right to participate in local and European
elections in one’s place of residence, consular and
diplomatic assistance while being in third countries,
etc. The exercise of these rights is only possible
when the person involved moves across borders.
2 New citizens of the European Union
According to the Accession Treaty, signed
between the European Union and the ten new
member states that joined the Community in 2004,
a transitional period with a maximum of seven years
(using a 2+3+2 system) was imposed, during which
Community law relating to the free movement of
persons would not apply fully to all citizens across
the enlarged the EU. During the transitional period,
workers of the “new” member states (except Cyprus
and Malta) could face restrictions regarding their
access to the labour markets of the “old” EU (EU-15).
At the inception of the new EU-25, only the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their
labour markets to the new member states1.
The main arguments used for introduction of
transitional periods concerned the fear of an
invasion of workers from the CEECs following their
accession to the EU, which was assumed would have
a negative impact on employment and the whole
economy of the EU-15 member states. Actually, the
arguments put forth were not convincing during the
time of accession negotiations, and they were based
on mistaken assumptions and economic predictions.
This was proven two years later by the European
Commission Report (Report on the Functioning of
the Transitional Arrangements set out in 2003,
2006), which showed that, contrary to expec-
tations, workers’ mobility from the new member
states to the EU-15 had mostly positive effects and
was, in most countries, less significant than
foreseen. Moreover, workers from the CEECs
contributed to relieving labour shortages and to
better economic performance of the EU as a whole.
The UK, Ireland and Sweden, which did not
introduce restrictions, identified high economic
growth, a decrease in unemployment, and a rise of
employment as a result of the opening of their
labour markets. For the EU as a whole, the flows of
workers were rather limited.
Thus, the introduction of transitional periods
was neither legitimate nor rationally founded2.
Moreover, the restrictions imposed on the new
members were in contradiction to the very
foundations of the internal market, which is based
on the free movement of goods, capital, services
and people. Additionally, they were contrary to the
goals of the European Union adopted by the
European Council during IGC 1996, which declared
its intention to build a more democratic and “ever
closer Union of citizens”. It would be difficult to
justify these restrictions with the stated programme
of bringing the Union closer to its citizens. And
finally, the exclusion of the new members from the
labour markets of the majority of the EU-15 states
was against the fundamental European values.
According to Vaclav Havel: “there are some values
which can be subjected neither to the interest of a
state nor to the economy. Among them are:
equality and dignity of all citizens” (Havel 1996, 2).
In other words, human and citizen rights come
first, not be subordinated to interests of economy
and community.
When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in
January 2007, a similar period of work restrictions
up to seven years was also included in their
Accession Treaty. While the majority of EU
countries have since lifted the restrictions, the UK
in this case is among the eight countries that still
require Bulgarian and Romanian citizens to have a
work permit, the others being Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and
the Netherlands.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the right of
free movement of persons (Art. 21 TFEU) is also
subject to limitations and conditions which, while
not mentioned in the Treaty, are contained in the
secondary legislation which was adopted to give
effect to the Treaty. The introduction of European
citizenship was associated with the adoption of
specific secondary legislation which referred to it.
Therefore the existing community legislation go-
verns the realisation of the right of free movement.
In particular, reference should be made to three
directives, adopted by the Council in 1990 and
1993. These directives, providing rights of resi-
dence for retired persons (Directive 90/364);
students (Directive 93/96); and persons who have
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ceased economic activity (Directive 90/365) state
that these groups of EU citizens, in order to enjoy
freedom of movement, have to possess sufficient
subsistence resources and proper health insurance.
These regulations are meant to ensure that these
groups of people and their families will not become a
financial burden on the social system of the host
member state. The ‘sufficient resources’ may be
higher than the level at which the host member state
grants social assistance to its own nationals, or
higher than the level of minimum pension. As a
result, those member states which offer more
generous social assistance in comparison to others
“will be able to exclude nationals who, although
above the subsistence minimum in their country of
origin, still possess fewer resources than the social
assistance minimum in the state in which they wish
to apply for residence”. These three documents have
been dubbed the ‘playboys’ directives’. Thus con-
trary to the reasoning of the Court of Justice given
below, each member state ultimately determines the
scope of EU citizens eligibility to the free movement
provisions. These practices are the result of a policy
aimed at protecting public funds and preventing
citizens of another member state from being a
burden on a member state’s national welfare system.
The conditions envisaged in the Directive 93/96
are not legitimate in the light of the case-law refer-
ring to the free movement of students. According to
the Court of Justice, equal treatment concerning
access to vocational training applies not only to the
conditions imposed by educational institutions, but
to any regulation affecting exercise of the right of
free movement. The Court held that denial of a
student’s a right to reside in a particular member
state would have the effect of denying them a right
to vocational training on equal basis, which is in
violation of EC law. As the Raulin case shows, a citi-
zen of a member state accepted for enrolment in a
vocational training programme in another member
state automatically enjoys the right to reside in that
member state for the period of the programme.
While the conditions delineated with respect to
‘sufficient resources and medical insurance’ protect
the interests of the member states, in practice they
violate the principle of equal treatment of European
citizens. The content of the directives is thus
contrary to the Commission’s claims that the intro-
duction of European citizenship was aimed at
improving the right of residence. In practice, without
sufficient subsistence resources and proper medical
insurance there is no right of residence, and without
a right of residence there is no access to vocational
training. An EU citizen without sufficient resources
one still be an EU citizen, but he/she will not be able
to go to another member state and enjoy the other
rights resulting from Union citizenship .
3 Modern exclusion in Europe
The situations described above, concerning the
accession conditions of the citizens of the new
member states, not to mention economically inactive
EU citizens and Third Country Nationals (TCN), lead
us to the conclusion that there is something amiss in
the theory and practice of a European Union citizen-
ship which allows for such discrimination.
The key argument of this paper is the statement
that the exclusion of some groups of Union citizens
from enjoyment of the very basic right envisaged
within Union citizenship is an expression of a crisis of
European identity. If we examine the situations very
carefully, we can observe that Europe has a serious
problem with encounters with the ‘Other’, which
constitutes one of the main challenges Europe faces
at the turn of the 21st century. In other words, the old
continent is not so open to Otherness, and this
'Western enclosure' is a very fundamental feature of
European modern political identity. Western ratio-
nality, as well as Western social practice, have been
developing in the direction of exclusion, fear, limi-
tation, egoism, and drawing a borderline between
itself and the 'Other'.
This attitude towards otherness is manifested in
acts of mass internment - that is, in the application of
a series of measures which impose the duty of work
on all those who are unable to earn their living.
According to Foucault, internment – i.e. enclosure of
otherness - derives from the imperative of work
(Foucault 1993, 68). The aim is to solve the problems
of ‘beggary and laziness as the sources of confusion’.
Hence it can be seen that the establishment of shel-
ters, asylum houses, hospitals or reformatories as a
means of elimination - exclusion of the ‘inconvenient’
and the ‘non-conforming’ - has been clearly based on
an economic rationale. This practice has provided the
tools for controlling wages in the event of demands
for wage increases, and it additionally has enabled the
‘liquidation’ of unemployment and/or concealment of
its negative consequences. According to Foucault:
"The economic and moral postulate of internment
was formulated as a result of certain working
experience. In the classical world, the demarcation
line between work and idleness was running along
the great exclusion of lepers. Instead of leper colo-
nies shelters were built (...) Reference was made to
the old rite of excommunication but in the field of
production and trade." (ibidem, 76).
By means of segregation the modern world has
tried to eliminate all those deemed to be "asocial", in
one way or another, in relation to the entire social
order. The author of ‘Discipline and punish’ notes that
there is a similarity between the eighteenth-century
internees and the today's mass internment of non-
conforming individuals - both the former and the
latter were created in the original act of segregation.
Since the mid-seventeenth century any person
banished from society becomes a prime candidate for
a future dweller and inmate in all kinds of prisons,
hospitals, shelters and asylums. He or she is the
object of the same gesture of dismissal which was
once used to get rid of lepers. Moreover, that gesture
has created the ‘asocial’ and the ‘non-conforming’
categories - it ‘produced the Stranger where he could
hardly be sensed; tore the thread apart, broke the
familiarity link (...) In one word, that gesture was the
cause of alienation’ (ibidem, 85).
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The big closure - as defined by Foucault – has
played not only a negative and excluding role, but
first and foremost it has had a profound impact on
mobilisation and organisation. Thanks to the exclu-
sion of others, dismissed as the ‘unreasonable’, the
world becomes more rational, orderly and uniform.
However, it is overlooked that the presence of the
‘asocial, the unuseful, actually allows for organising
the entire society in a more functional way. Just as
for Descartes the presence of the unreasonable
sphere of madness, dreams, delusions allowed for
reinforcing the clarity of Truth itself, similarly the
existence of the Other, strangers in the social
sphere. constitutes an excellent reservoir of sense.
The implications of this truth were already perceived
in nineteenth century capitalism, for which the
armies of the unemployed - thrown outside the
margins of the society - were one of the sources of
coherence and efficiency of the production process.
The presence of the unemployed was a perfect
motivating factor that mobilised all those who did
not want to find themselves in a similar situation
with respect to work.
Foucault's philosophy attempts to unveil the
history of reason, which in modern times assumes
the shape of scientific knowledge, technology, pro-
duction, and political organisation (Foucault 1988,
25). The rationality, its logos, involves the unceasing
act of self-confirmation through exclusion, self-
limitation, and drawing a borderline between oneself
and the other.
According to Zygmunt Bauman, at a certain point
in history the Other meant Jews, whose exclusion
was a part of the Christian identity. ‘The concept of a
Jew,’ says the author of Modernity and the
Holocaust, ‘provided an important lesson that the
alternative to the existing order was not another
order but only chaos and destruction.’ (Bauman
1992, 69). At the end of the seventeenth century the
segregation of Jews was a manifestation of fear of
contamination of Europe; repressions against them
and against other minorities became a major factor
of European modern times. In Delanty’s opinion, it is
likely that the Reformation-driven split within
Christianity's bosom was planned in order to find
scapegoats - with Jews and women constituting a
perfect fit. The author of Inventing Europe claims
that this could ‘explain the great exodus of Jews
from Central Europe and the increasing witch-hunts
which accompanied the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation. Following the ultimate retreat of the
Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, Europe was
liberated from its external enemy, therefore the role
of the victim - the European "Other" - was assigned
to an internal enemy: Jews’ (Delanty 1999, 61).
The East, brought to life by Western reason, was
perceived as both the borderline and baseline of the
West, and hence it also became the ‘Other’. Accor-
ding to Foucault ‘the East constitutes one of the
divisions within the universality of the Western ratio:
The East, thought to be the origin, the bewildering
source of nostalgias and promises of return. The
East, given away to the colonizing reason of the West
and at the same time somehow forbidding - as it will
always be the borderline, the night of beginnings
that gave rise to the West - the West which drew a
demarcation line within it. The East will be everything
which the West is not, although it still has to search
for its primary truth there.’ (Foucault 1993, 137).
Also, Delanty argues that the ‘historical aware-
ness’ of Western Europe was shaped under the in-
fluence of three sources of threats: Muslims, Jews
and Slavs. Similarly as in the case of Muslims and
Jews, Slavs were considered by Western Europeans
to be Asians or semi-Asians. They formed an impor-
tant bargaining chip in trade with the Islamic world.
Europe was selling Slavs as slaves, hence the origin
of the name Slavs, as noted by Lewis (Lewis 1993,
23).
At the outset of modern times, the grain trade led
to a split between the West and the East. In conse-
quence Europe witnessed two independent stages of
feudalism: in Western Europe between the ninth and
fourteenth centuries, and in the East between the
fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. With the develop-
ment of the Western Europe its eastern part was
becoming slavishly subjected to the West. Conse-
quently, the concept of ‘Europe’ was associated with
the institution of West European nation-states, and
adopted somewhat a normative character. It was not
perceived as an alternative to a nation-state, but to
the contrary, the concept of ‘Europe' became sub-
jected to national interests. Contrary to the United
States, in Europe the idea of statehood and the
national idea were placed ahead of, and instru-
mental in defining. international norms and ins-
titutions. During the Enlightenment era the term
‘Europe’, being the alternative to the nation-state,
was present only among intellectual elites, having
no meaning to ordinary people, since the conflicts
between the nation-states were too severe. Accor-
ding to de Rougement, the idea of Europe was
essentially devised by France for purposes of
expansion, by pleading the ‘superiority of the
European religion, the white race and the French
language’. At the turn of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries, one of the early concepts of
European political governance was ‘the great project
of Henry IV, prepared by Prince Sully, for whom
Europe was supposed to be in fact the extension of
France. Establishing an alliance of the Western states
against Turks was to be an essential element of that
plan.’ (de Rougement 1996, 157)
Thus the identity of Europe was being constituted
in opposition to and out of fear of what was
different, other. Here, the Orient also played a
crucial role. The Orient, being the ‘substitute of the
otherness of others’, was at the same time a
distorting mirror of the West. Europe needed the
other in opposition, against whom it could build its
own identity. Therefore the European nature was
being established around the antagonism between
the West on the one side, and Orient and the East on
the other. The previous opposition of Christianity
against Islam was substituted by the opposition of
civilisation against barbarism. The nineteenth cen-
tury carried a conviction that Europe represented the
civilisation ideal, and that its mission was to civilize
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the world. The non-European world was perceived as
a reflection of what Europe used to be, and ‘Europe’
was deemed to have become the embodiment of
Western values, treated as universal principles.
The category of race, rather than language or
religion, became the uniting factor for nineteenth-
century Europe. It was a period which witnessed the
development of anthropology - the study of ‘primi-
tive people’, which was supposed to provide the
scientific explanation for Europe's spiritual and in-
tellectual superiority over extra-European commu-
nities. (Delanty 129) After the fall of the Ottoman
Empire during the First World War, the role of Islam
was taken over by Communism. The October
Revolution transformed the final stage of Wold War
One into a battle between capitalist and communist
countries.
The Cold War was in a sense a continuation of that
process, during which Europe's identity was formed
in opposition to the Soviet bloc. In this light the
Berlin wall, erected in 1961, became a symbol of the
Europe's internal division and an incarnation of the
age-old conflict between the West and the East.
Delanty notes that ‘this profound division was visible
even in the attitude of Western Jews towards Jews
from the East, whom they often disregarded and
discriminated against. (...) The mutual hostility
between the East and the West would always focus
on certain groups that were compelled to carry the
historical burden. It should be strongly emphasised
that the cultural representations of the reality
crystallised in the form of regressive identities based
on the category of race, xenophobic concepts of
nationalism and on obscure irrationalism" (ibidem).
It should be pointed out that the term "cold war",
rooted in the medieval conflict between Christianity
and Islam - was rediscovered by Walter Lipmann just
after the Second World War. It was to provide the
ideological foundation for Europe's defence against
the potential danger emanating from the Soviet
Union, as well as against any potential rebirth of the
Third Reich. During the cold war, the Western men-
tality and the framework of political discussion was
shaped by the conflict between liberal democracy
and Communism. The European identity built during
this time was personified by the establishment of
West Germany as the Federal Republic of Germany,
rooted in the West, and of East Germany i.e. the
German Democratic Republic - set up in the Soviet
occupation zone.
In this sense, the Europe's integration was a
continuation of the history of Western rationality,
and therefore the very embodiment of the logic of
exclusion - bringing to life yet another Other - the
mad, the sick, the offender, the woman, the Jew, the
Slav or finally - the non-European, who, where
necessary, could be used as the evidence of Western
rationality, fitness, righteousness, purity, superiority,
etc. The continent's integration was somewhat a
materialisation of Europe's heritage to date, a Europe
which, according to Waldenfels, considered itself
‘the incarnation and warden of the real faith, the
right reason, true advancement, civilised humanity,
universal discussion... The name ‘Europe’ allows to
speak "in the name of..." , and the speaker becomes
a self-declared spokesman. One does not judge
some civilisation anymore, one makes judgements
"in the name of civilisation." (ibidem)
Europe's post-war unification process was materi-
alised at the outset as an integration against “non-
Europeans”, including all those who found them-
selves on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Yalta
was both a complementary element and con-
currently the beginning of a history that - driven by
its own logic - split Europe in two and established its
own Other, against whom the West could success-
fully unite. The Cold War era, and especially the
fifties and the sixties, are in principle the best years
of the unification process, the period of its greatest
success. The fear of the Soviet threat - the Other -
functioned perfectly as one of the driving forces of
the integration machine. We have to keep in mind
that the post-war integration process resulted not
only from the need to solve the German problem and
to ensure the economic development and political
stability of ‘Europe’; it was also caused by the threat
of communism and the Soviet Union. This is why the
integration itself was actively supported by the pope
and the Catholic Church, treating the unification of
Europe as the best remedy against the ideology of
evil (i.e. communism). It was no accident that the
founding fathers of European integration, including
Monnet, Schumann, and de Gasperi, came from the
Christian democratic party.
Thus, ironically, the collapse of Communism and
the end of the Cold War in 1989 turned out to be a
big ‘shock’ to the West, and a source of chaos and
destabilisation. Its world almost fell apart, depriving
Europe of the foundations that had been so vital for
its development. While the victory of ‘Solidarity’,
followed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, initially
aroused hopes for permanent abolition of the
barriers that divided the Old Continent, after a short
period of euphoria the Western states started
fencing off their Eastern neighbours with a new, less
visible wall – that of fear. The liberation of the
Central and Eastern European countries offered huge
opportunities, but also presented a danger to the
Western part of the continent. Jerzy Łukaszewski
notes that ‘one of the major integration catalysts,
i.e. the threat from the East, disappeared.’
(Łukaszewski 1998, 91)
After the 2005 referenda and in the context of the
present financial and institutional crisis, there
remains a fear of immigrants in Europe. The former
French minister for Foreign Affairs, Dominique de
Villepin, expressed an opinion that vividly reflected
the nature of the problem. He said that “there is a
fear of the other in the heart of Europe, of the other
culture, of the neighbouring state” (de Villepin,
2002). In this sense Europe has always been sick
because of the Other, and that illness is still present
on the old continent.
4 Future of European citizenship
In order to meet the challenge of its encounter
with the Other, Europe must overcome its limitations
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and develop a new identity able to deal and commu-
nicate with that same Other. According to Theodora
Kostakopoulou, putting an excessive emphasis on the
Greek, Roman or Christian heritage may become the
sprouting seed of European racism and xenophobia.
Europe must overcome its previous limitations and
start building its identity towards the Other, rather
than against the Other. (Kostakopoulou 2001, 26)
The intellectual premises for a new approach to
the problem of the ‘Other’ have been expressed most
comprehensively in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas
and the so-called ‘philosophy of dialogue’, having
also such prominent representatives as Martin Buber,
Franz Rosenzweig, and Gabriel Marcel. According to
Levinas, meeting the Other is a ‘fundamental event’
in a human being’s contact with the world. The Other
is the only one and unique being in the philosophy of
dialogue, and is considered to be of the highest
value, as being a concept which can protect the indi-
vidual against the danger posed to human identity by
the masses and the great totalitarian systems of the
twentieth century. It has been proven that indiffe-
rence towards the Other can, under specific circum-
stances, lead to Auschwitz.
In his philosophy, Levinas leads us to the pre-
community sources of morality, seeing the meeting
with the Other as the original experience. Such a
meeting is the greatest experience and basis for all
later relations between people, and also a way of
approaching God. Keeping good relations with
Others, as the basic attribute of human existence,
above all means taking responsibility. According to
Levinas, if the Other is looking at me, I am respon-
sible for him. My responsibility for the Other is un-
conditional; it is not dependent on any previous
knowledge about the Other but is rather ahead of
that knowledge. The author of ‘Totality and Infinity’
says: ‘I analyse human inner-relations which - in the
nearness of the Other - apart from the impression
which I myself make on another human - his face,
expression of the Other, is decisive for me to serve
him (...) The face is commanding and deciding. Its
meaning involves command. Precisely speaking, if the
face means command in my imagination, it is not the
way an ordinary sign manifests its meaning; this
command makes up the entire meaning of the face.’
(cited after Bauman, op. cit., 252) In other words, in
Levinas's opinion the responsibility for the Other is
the original element of subjectivity. It is not stimu-
lated by any primary force, ethical or legal code, or
fear of penalty. Only when I become responsible, do I
become a subject. It is sufficient to break through the
curtain of everyday life to be able to arrive at the
source of our existence.
In this sense this is a postulating philosophy, and
also ethical to the core - a philosophy that requires a
certain heroism and going beyond our ordinary
experience and habits in our relations with the Other
people. Today more than ever Europe needs this
heroism and needs to go beyond its traditional
approach to Otherness.
This ‘new thinking’ about the European problem
found its specific continuation in the thought of
Jacques Derrida. In his ‘The Other Heading’ Derrida
discloses a somewhat different, more political face of
deconstructionism, of which he was the most well-
known representative. The ambiguous title of his
book, which could be understood as ‘the other
headland, direction, course’, is an indication of the
specific intellectual journey of its author. It is a
manifestation of the search for a new definition of
European identity, or rather a different way of
looking and thinking about the identity itself.
According to Derrida, the traditional understanding
of Europe's identity is a closure in ‘our own’, leaving
the ‘foreign’ and ‘other’ behind. However, ‘it is a
culture's attribute not to be identical with itself. To
think about Europe in a different way means to think
about the European identity in terms of "otherness",
"difference", "pluralism", "apory".’ Therefore, the
other course (the Other Heading) is not so much a
suggestion of a new ‘goal’ or ‘vision’, but rather a
transformation of thinking. Europe must begin to
think of itself in terms of the ‘other’. As Derrida
writes, ‘We need to become guards of a certain idea
of Europe, a certain otherness of Europe - yet Europe
that is not closing the door of its own identity and
which is exemplifying the striving for what it is not,
towards the opposite side or towards the other. We
need to devise and imagine the new style of thinking
in which the identity comes from the otherness and
not vice versa.’ (Derrida 1992, 29). It will be difficult
to do without paradox here, with responsibility being
its ethical and political dimension. If responsibility is
to be free from Eurocentrism - in other words, from
equating Europe's integration with West European
integration - Europe must be reflected upon in a new
way. This new way means that Europe will not only
be responsible for the ‘other’ but its own identity will
be constituted by the ‘other’. Moreover, that
responsibility should be realised - according to the
French philosopher - through respect for diversity,
otherness, but at the same time for common values.
Thus rejecting the easy and alluring solution of
either a full unification or a total dispersion, Derrida
speaks of the necessary action to be taken within the
framework of the enlightenment values of liberal
democracy, emphasising at the same time that those
values are not sufficient in and of themselves to
ensure respect for the ‘other’. What we need is a
definition of the European identity, or a way of
thinking about it, which would combine the univer-
salism of its values with its ‘diversity’. For Europe
‘must not get dispersed into a thousand provinces,
separate views, idiosyncrasies or small nationalisms,
but on the other hand it must not submit to the
tyranny of centralised power.’ (ibidem)
At this critical juncture in the integration process,
when a more adequate ‘vision of unification’ seems
necessary, the reflections represented by Jacques
Derrida may provide the answer to the urgent
challenge of our contemporary times. For one thing
is certain, Europe - facing qualitatively new problems
in its encounters with the Other - is in need of a
thorough revision (deconstruction) of the funda-
mental categories on which its identity is built. It
should be emphasised however that Derrida does
not offer ready solutions, plans, or overall projects.
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Report on the Functioning of the Transitional
Arrangements set out in the 2003 Accession
Treaty. 2006. (period 1 May 2004–30 April 2006),
Commission of the European Communities,
COM(2006) 48 final, Brussels, 8. February.
de Rougement, Denis, 1966. The Idea of Europe,
Macmillan, New York.
de Villepin, Dominique. 2002. Why Europe ?,
„Gazeta Wyborcza”, 15 October.
Endnotes
1 In 2006, after the first phase of the transitional period, Spain ,
Italy, Denmark, Portugal decided to open their labour markets.
2 It is often argued that transitional periods for accession to
labour markets of the EU were also introduced when Spain and
Portugal joined the EU in 1986. However, it should be noted that at
that time this restrictions were not a violation of Union citizens’
rights, because the concept of European citizenship was introduced
to the European legislation within the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
Thus it was a different legal context.
He only indicates the direction (the Other Heading)
where answers and solutions should be sought to the
ever new problems and challenges. The signs on that
road include the new identity determined by the
‘other’ and by responsibility for the ‘other’. Whether
the proposals of these philosophers are realistic is a
completely different question…
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